ABSTRACT: Paul Marshall takes extrovertive mystical experience seriously by providing a metaphysical framework inspired by Plotinus and Leibniz that aims to interpret it nonreductively and to explain it persuasively. However praiseworthy Marshall's intentions, his account fails for a variety of reasons, among them an inability to establish convincingly why natural objects appear as transfigured and alive, characteristics frequently encountered in the reports of nature mystics. An alternative approach, rooted in contemporary pan-experientialist philosophy of mind, is able to take extrovertive mysticism equally seriously while accounting more successfully for its preeminent features at a less extravagant metaphysical cost.
Paul Marshall's Mystical Encounters with the Natural World
1 is doubly noteworthy: his study brings welcome and sustained attention to the neglected phenomenon of nature mysticism, and his attempt to explain the phenomenon he documents treats the reports he collects (and their reporters) in a strikingly serious fashion. This is to say, first, that he offers us far and away the most thorough look at the topic of extrovertive mysticism that we possess. If his book's very comprehensive survey of its subject and detailed engagement with the entire range of scholarly discussion over the last century reflects its origin as a dissertation, it is none the worse for that. Writers on mysticism have tended to give a disproportionate share of their attention to introvertive mysticism, whose typical embedding in the context of institutional religion complicates its analysis, and it is good to have the imbalance redressed. Second, to say that he takes mysticism seriously is to say that he goes beyond the typical concerns of philosophers of mysticism: he limits himself neither to phenomenological description (although his phenomenology is careful and valuable) nor to epistemological concerns about the truth value of mystics' claims. Rather he is concerned to speculate about the metaphysics in relation to which the experiences he has documented would make sense.
Taking those experiences and the reports of them seriously, as I am using the expression, involves finding a middle path between a literalist understanding, as is common among religious adherents, who, in assessing the metaphysical import of testimony arising within their own tradition, tend to take it at face value, and a reductionist understanding, which typically tries to explain the experiences in terms of the naturalist commitments of the investigator. (For example, Proudfoot, while rejecting 'descriptive reduction', embraces 'explanatory reduction', which 'consists in offering an explanation of an experience in terms that are not those of the subject and that might not meet with his approval', and so can easily fail to take mysticism seriously in the sense intended here. 2 )
Rather, taking a report seriously-while it does not preclude reevaluating or reinterpreting claims after critically considering them either alone or in relation to other religious, philosophical, or scientific ideas-nevertheless involves, roughly, an unwillingness to forego a realistic interpretation of the reporters' descriptions, an unwillingness to betray their metaphysical 'drift', so to speak. 3 Literalist readings tend to be more consequential and problematic in the frequently highly ramified accounts of introvertive religious mystics, but reductionist readings are common for all sorts of religious experience and seemingly de rigueur in some portions of the academic community. Obviously, those with naturalist leanings are not going to be sympathetic to treating mysticism seriously, in the sense intended here. This paper is not intended to challenge their approach directly, however, for Marshall does not belong to their number.
By bringing a scheme inspired by Plotinus and Leibniz to bear on the interpretation of the phenomenon he has described, he explains his subjects' experiences in a way that likely goes beyond their metaphysical commitments without being dismissive of their ideas about the general direction in which their experiences pointed. Those who share
Marshall's conviction that problems encountered by physicalism in contemporary philosophy of mind give good reason for not rushing to embrace the explanatory reduction of the mystical to the physiological will be grateful for the general tendency of his thought. Yet to be grateful for that tendency, as I am, is not necessarily to find it persuasive in its details. In this paper I risk the charge of ingratitude by arguing that
Marshall's account does not in fact succeed very well in explaining the phenomenon that 4 forms the topic of his study. The failure of this account, however, does nothing to impugn the project of taking nature mysticism seriously, as the alternative advanced here aims to show; while it incorporates the key features of the experience that Marshall documents, the account developed below nevertheless avoids the problems exposed in his own.
The phenomenology of mystical experiences of the natural world is complex, and no two authorities who conduct independent investigations come up with identical lists of central characteristics. I will focus on four features that regularly appear in mystical experiences involving the objects of the natural world, examples of which will appear later in the discussion: (i) unity, both among the objects of experience and between those objects and the subject (this includes the frequently encountered notion of the expansion of the self insofar as the self is enlarged by somehow incorporating what had hitherto been outside of itself); (ii) the sense that those objects are in some sense alive, or that a living presence permeates nature; (iii) the transfiguration of natural objects; and (iv) a sense of timelessness, an eternal present, or at least some sort of altered timeconsciousness. (In regard to the topic of 'unity', Bernard McGinn has urged that mysticism be understood more broadly than mystical union. 4 This is certainly a persuasive claim in the area of nature mysticism, where awareness of a 'spiritual presence' is not always accompanied by an experience of union with that presence.
However, expressions of union are common enough in the mystical reports to regard it as a frequent, if not a universal, characteristic of such experiences.) While these are not the only features that are claimed by various writers to characterize extrovertive mystical experience, they seem to encompass all those that Wainwright finds to occur in the most 5 common types, they are prominent in Marshall's own account (ME, 60ff., 73f., 68ff., and 72f.), and they all figure in Stace's discussion of the phenomenon, even if all are not explicitly on his list. 5 Although I believe there is good reason for interpreting (iii) in terms of (ii), others evidently disagree-Wainwright treats them independently, and
Marshall bases transfiguration on the revelation of a phenomenon's noumenal sourceand so I list them separately. These are the characteristics, then, that any scheme will have to explain if it is to be taken seriously, and to explain nonreductively if it is to take mysticism seriously.
Problems with Marshall on nature mysticism
Marshall's position is an idealist response generated by the difficulties of attempts at dualist and materialist solutions to the mind-body problem and by hopes of integrating mystical and idealist notions with contemporary physics. The scheme is indebted to Plotinus in its vision of an intelligible (or at least nonphenomenal) cosmos and to Leibniz in its plurality of cosmic minds differentiated by their perspectives. Marshall is perfectly clear that the revival of not only old but old-fashioned idealist notions is at odds with reigning naturalisms and will consequently appear fanciful to many within the contemporary philosophical mainstream, but he recognizes that taking mystical encounters with the natural world seriously demands a willingness to challenge conventional viewpoints (see, for example, ME, 267-268). Granting this point hardly guarantees the success of his approach, of course, and the challenges to follow will not be based on charges of implausibility, strangeness, or the like, but on the adequacy with which his scheme is able to do justice to the phenomena in question. As a consequence of this, the highly developed presentation of the details of Marshall's own position in his 6 various writings will not be recapitulated here. The baldness of my delineation of his views is not intended to make them look less defensible than they are, but only to allow the focus of the discussion to remain on their explanatory success in handling the mystical phenomena in question.
The salient features of Marshall's metaphysics are as follows. His system is idealist, with two sorts of minds: 'little minds' and 'great minds' (ME, 264) or, alternatively, the 'personal self' and the 'universal self', or 'ordinary minds' and the 'greater mind'. 6 (It should be noted that the personal self includes both the experiential self and the personal unconscious; it is the experiential self, which Marshall also refers to as the phenomenological self, that is of primary interest here. In these passages 'universal self' and 'greater mind' appear in the singular, for a plurality of such minds is only introduced later on in his discussions.) The contents of a great mind, of which there are many, include (but are not exhausted by) the totality of noumena. Because all great minds are manifestations of a single underlying principle, their contents do not represent different universes: 'Each great mind has the universe as its noumenal contents, but the minds differ by expressing the universe from their individual vantage points' (ME, 265).
It is not the Leibnizian dimension of each great mind representing a particular perspective on the universe, however, but the Plotinian dimension of each soul having access to a level of Intellect whose object of knowledge is true being (or true beings) that is central There are several problems with this account. To begin with, in the first level of extrovertive experience the noumenal background plays no real explanatory role: the unity characteristic of mystical experience is encountered even though 'the noumenal background is not strongly felt'. Only at the second level, where 'the phenomenal stream begins to reveal its noumenal bedrock', does the scheme really come into play, as the phenomenal contents undergo 'luminous transfigurations'. Yet, it is with those phenomenal objects to which this first level limits its attention that extrovertive mystical experiences are typically concerned, and, as Marshall admits, the sense of unity so central to mystical experience is already present at his most elementary 'stage'. Thus, when
Bede Griffiths tries to explain the experiences he had as a student, he makes it clear that it was the world of natural phenomena-birds, trees, sunsets-that was their subject: 'But it was not only that my senses were awakened. I experienced an overwhelming emotion in the presence of nature, especially at evening. It began to wear a kind of sacramental character for me. . . . The songs of the birds, the shapes of the tree, the colors of the sunset were so many signs of this presence, which seemed to be drawing me to itself'.
Moreover, if the phenomenal world disguised anything, it was not Marshall's noumenal objects but Divinity: 'I hardly dared to look on the face of the sky, because it seemed as though it was but a veil before the face of God'. 8 When an unnamed undergraduate tries to explain his experience of union, it is clear that the subject-object identity stands between him and the phenomenal, not some noumenal object: 'It's like losing your particular sense of identity and it's just like, say, looking at a tree. You see certain things happening to the tree and you have words to describe it. There's nothing between us, the tree and me'. 9 Among nature mystics, identity and transfiguration are typically experienced in relation to phenomenal objects, and while Marshall acknowledges that such experiences occur, it is important to note that his metaphysical scheme does nothing to explain them. Having no place in his explanatory framework, he tends to downplay how central this 'level' is to the phenomenon of nature mysticism and tries to locate it as a 'simple' and merely introductory stage. Yet even when he does attempt to draw on his metaphysics for the explanation of the experience of the transfiguration of phenomenal objects, his scheme seems poorly equipped to accomplish that end, as we shall now see. One is encountered merely alongside ordinary perceptual contents, pointing out that extrovertive accounts more typically 'describe unities with or of diversified nature' (ME, 149), but here he offers something disappointingly similar. He presents an account of nature mysticism according to which an experience of the noumenon is encountered merely alongside its corresponding phenomenon and recognized as its cause. Just as Stace was mistaken in thinking that a sense of mystical identification could be explained simply by positing a unity alongside natural objects-rather, the natural objects are themselves unified with one another or with the subject-so Marshall is mistaken in thinking that the transfiguration of the natural world is explained simply by positing a distinct noumenon alongside natural objects-rather, the natural objects are themselves transfigured. Perhaps the hope is that in a single consciousness the noumenon will somehow provide an 'aura' for the phenomenon (rather as Stace suggested that Oneness 'is experienced as shining through from beyond or behind' the objects of the senses 13 ), but the noumenon is not present to the phenomenal consciousness, and for the great mind the noumenon is perceived as distinct from, qualitatively different from, and the cause of the phenomenon, hardly the set of relationships that would plausibly constitute the transfiguration of the phenomenal object. In the 'great mind' this object is not transfigured because it remains unchanged; its perception is merely supplemented with a related but independent and nonsensory experience of the causally connected noumenon.
Transfiguration will need to be sought elsewhere. that is, to use Stace's alternative formulation, possessing 'its own subjectivity': for each thing, there is something that it is like to be that thing, in the language Thomas Nagel made famous. This is a reasonable gloss on the statements of other nature mystics: the attribution of life is the attribution of inwardness, subjectivity, consciousness. As
Marshall himself observes about many of his cases, 'Life means consciousness' (ME, 74), but the fact that the noumenal cosmos of Plotinus' intellectual vision is 'boiling with life' does nothing to establish that the phenomenal world is experienced as alive, as shot through with consciousness, and it is the phenomenal world, not its 'noumenal bedrock', that is experienced as alive.
This immediately suggests an alternative account for the 'transfiguration' experienced by nature mystics: rather than being transfigured because the 'noumenal bedrock' begins to shine through the 'phenomenal stream', phenomenal objects are transfigured because while to ordinary consciousness they appear 'dead', the mystical vision shows them to be 'alive'. On the translation scheme advocated above, this is equivalent to saying that things that appeared merely objective are seen to be subjective, and their subjective character is what accounts for the sense that they have been transfigured. N.M. says as much: 'everything appeared to have an "inside"-to exist as I existed, having inwardness, a kind of individual life, and every object, seen under this aspect, appeared exceedingly beautiful'. 21 If the transfigured character can be explained without appealing to the incursion of Marshall's noumenal realm, perhaps that framework is in general unnecessary for making sense of extrovertive mystical experience, even if we remain committed to taking that experience seriously. Marshall's own account begins from the difficulties encountered in recent philosophy of mind as it has attempted to do justice to the phenomenon of consciousness while remaining faithful to its physicalist agenda. In responding to these problems, some writers have been willing to engage in what is, by the standards of analytic philosophy, rather free-wheeling speculations. Certainly no one will get far in taking mystical experience seriously by trying to hew closely to the materialist mainstream of contemporary philosophy, but it may be worthwhile to turn to some of the ideas in the philosophy of mind that have emerged in the attempts to circumvent the dead ends to which an adherence to physicalism has repeatedly led philosophers trying to do justice to mental phenomena.
So far discussion suggests that taking seriously the transfiguration of the physical world characteristic of nature mysticism will first of all involve taking the claim that nature is 'alive' seriously, a claim to be understood in terms of pan-subjectivity.
Surveying the metaphysical scene for a supportive theoretical framework, contemporary those structures are accompanied by consciousness. The 'hard problem' in these areas is thus to explain why the satisfaction of functionalist requirements or the neural processing that goes on when we are engaged in 'mental activities' is accompanied by consciousness, by a subjective inner life. How, then, is consciousness to be explained, if these approaches say so little about it? There seem to be two options: either consciousness emerges upon the attainment of a certain level of (neural) complexity, or consciousness is already omnipresent, so that its incidence at any particular location in the universe calls for no special explanation. Unsurprisingly, advocates of the latter, panpsychist or panexperientialist, approach find problems with the idea of emergence, or at least with the idea of the emergence of consciousness. The arguments go like this: if the appearance of emergence is simply due to our epistemological condition, then emergence as a metaphysical matter does not occur, while if emergence is ontologically genuine, it is nevertheless the case that consciousness is not a plausible contender as an emergent entity. Advocates of the first approach include Nagel, those of the second Strawson.
Without rehearsing the arguments in detail, the first approach suggests that the novelty and unpredictability characteristic of emergent phenomena result only from our ignorance, If dualism is implausible, if the standard materialist options disqualify themselves by explaining 'mind' without explaining consciousness, and if the hopes pinned on emergence turn out to be vain, then panpsychism offers itself as an alternative worth considering. While the arguments in its support are of course controversial and not all will find them as compelling as I do, the main points to be insisted upon here are two:
first, that panpsychism has come to be regarded by some in the philosophy of mind, obviously for entirely independent reasons, as a position deserving advocacy; second, that panpsychism is precisely the sort of view that enables one to take nature mysticism seriously insofar as nature mystics view nature as 'alive', that is, possessed of subjectivity, and insofar as seeing nature as alive plausibly explains the mystics' sense that nature has become transfigured in their experience. If panpsychism enables us to explain two of the features characteristic of nature mysticism, namely, the sense that nature is alive and that the experience reveals nature as transfigured, we may persist in investigating whether it can also provide a foundation for explaining the other two features mentioned, namely, unity and timelessness.
Let us turn, then, to the mystical experience of the unity of nature: nature seems to be unified both in itself and with the subject. Here the concern is primarily with the unity between subject and object, for the other sort of unity can be seen as derivative from this. (Marshall has a useful classification of the different types of unification found in experiences associated with nature mysticism (ME, 60-64). Here we are primarily concerned with what he calls 'identifcatory unity', in which subjects experience themselves as identified with the world, and 'incorporative unity', in which subjects experience the world as contained within themselves. Objects incorporated in me have by that very fact achieved a certain sort of unity with one another.) We have already encountered experiences of this sort above, 25 but looking at a few others helps bring out further features of interest. For example, the following passage goes beyond a mere claim of the identity of subject and object by analysing this breakdown into an expansion of the self: 'The first symptom was a sudden hush that seemed to envelop me-this was subjective, however, as my hearing and my other senses appeared actually to be keener 20 than normal. Then, almost at once, I had a strange feeling of expansion, which I find very difficult to describe. It seemed to me that, in some way, I was extending into my surroundings and was becoming one with them'. 26 This expansion, in turn, manifests itself in Richard Jefferies as the feeling of the life of the objects around him as his own:
'Dreamy in appearance, I was breathing full of existence; I was aware of the grass blades, the flowers, the leaves on hawthorn and tree. I seemed to live more largely through them, as if each were a pore through which I drank'. 27 Taken together, such experiences suggest that central to unitive nature mysticism is the union of the self with natural objects, a union that results from the expansion of the self so as in some way to incorporate those objects and to experience them from within. Now we have just seen that the supposition that natural objects have an 'inside' is not alien to some contemporary discussions within the philosophy of mind, but taking mysticism seriously demands further that the subject have access to that 'inside', and this evidently must result from an 'expansion of the self'. We may again receive assistance by turning to discussions in contemporary philosophy of mind, in this case to discussions of the unity of consciousness.
The unity of consciousness refers to the fact that the elements of our It is helpful here to recall the theory of Royce regarding consciousness of the present, 35 for it represents an attempt to explain how to accommodate successiveness within the eternal, and in so doing it also suggests how even something short of consciousness of a timeless eternity can involve an altered awareness of time relevant to our current concerns. Royce notes that, in one sense of the term 'present', a succession (such as the notes of a melody) is experienced as a whole, as present all at once. While we can encompass only a brief succession as present in this manner, for Royce all time is present to the Absolute in just this way, and eternity is to be understood in terms of such a mental state: 'A consciousness related to the whole of the world's events, and to the whole of time, precisely as our human consciousness is related to a single melody or rhythm, and to the brief but still extended interval of time which this melody or rhythm occupies,-such a consciousness, I say, is an Eternal Consciousness'. 36 Moreover,
Royce also supposes that what was experienced as present or all at once might vary in its time-span for different beings. 37 Applying these ideas to the present case, one might conclude that as consciousness expands in an extrovertive mystical experience so too might the time-span of the subject's specious present expand, either because its consciousness more adequately comes to approximate that of the Absolute with its allencompassing 'present', its eternal now, or because its consciousness subsumes another whose present involves a more extended time-span. Just as we are aware of the succession of one note after another in a brief melody even as the melody is also present to us all at once, so might we be aware of more extended successions occurring in a specious present whose time-span was greater than normal. In that case our altered perception of time might present us with a consciousness quite unlike our typical one, in which, for example, a wasp might 'move without moving' because a flight too lengthy to be ordinarily experienced as a whole was now able to be perceived all at once by our expanded consciousness. While admittedly speculative, these ideas are at least entirely compatible with the account of extrovertive mysticism advanced here. Unlike strict timelessness, the altered time-consciousness encountered among nature mystics lends itself to an explanation purely in terms of transformed subjective faculties and does not require an appeal to a nonphenomenal realm, neither to the silent desert of the introvertive mystic nor to the noumenal realm of Marshall.
Thus the preeminent features of nature mysticism-a sense of an altered timeconsciousness, of unity, and of the objects of nature as transfigured and alive-can be explained in a way that takes them seriously and yet avoids all the difficulties identified with Marshall's postulation of a noumenal realm behind the phenomenal but occasionally 'shining through'. For the phenomenal objects are alive, that is, conscious; we perceive them as conscious when our consciousness expands so as to subsume and unite with theirs; this appropriation of the consciousness of what had previously seemed 'dead'
